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Abstract The question of how public managers use public sector performance information 
received significant scholarly attention in recent years. The promise of performance management 
systems was to rationalize the decision making process by creating objective performance 
metrics that citizens, political officials, and public managers could use to assess the performance 
of public organizations. Some theoretical work suggests, however, that there is a certain 
subjectivity to these data, which arises from an individual’s role in their organization or broader 
political environment. Furthermore, a recent spate of experimental work in this area suggests 
subjectivity might also arise, at the individual level, through cognitive bias. I bridge these two 
bodies of scholarship with a framework of performance information processing, which 
incorporates four models of political information use into the story of how public managers use 
performance information. I suggest that cognitive bias can contribute to the subjectivity of 
performance information when public managers process performance information. In other 
words, a model of meaning avoidance suggests that managers accurately receive performance 
information from management systems, but that cognitive biases influence the ways in which 
they interpret or act upon that information. In this essay, I provide empirical evidence for this 
model. I show that despite different presentations, public managers can accurately recount the 
objective information they saw when asked to recall it. I also provide evidence that despite being 
equally aware of objective raw performance metrics, public managers exhibit evidence of 
cognitive bias when asked to interpret the meaning of that information. This study contributes to 
the broader discussion of how individuals use performance information.
1 
INTRODUCTION 
“Empiricism assumes that objects can be understood independently of observing subjects. Truth 
is therefore assumed to lie in a world external to the observer whose job is to record and 
faithfully reflect the attributes of objects.” (Harvey, 2001) 
 “Against positivism, which halts at phenomena—"there are only facts"–I would say: no, facts is 
precisely what there are not, only interpretations.” Friedrich Nietzsche, as cited in (Cox, 1999) 
 
How individuals use the performance information created by now ubiquitous performance 
management systems is one of the big questions facing public management scholars today. One of 
the challenges in tackling this question is our ability to adequately model the broader set of actions 
and processes that ultimately contribute to performance information use. The purpose of this paper 
is to present a framework based on cognitive psychology that describes four different models of 
performance information use along with empirical evidence to support one of these models. 
In 1995, Robert Behn suggested that one of the big questions facing scholars who study 
public sector organizations was understanding how “public managers use measures of the 
achievements of public agencies to produce even greater achievements” (Behn, 1995). Yet, 
recently, 20 years after Behn pointed out a major question for researchers in the field, a prominent 
scholar commented that “we know little about the basic tendency of individuals to incorporate and 
use performance information” (Moynihan, 2015). While scholars have developed frameworks, 
such as the Interactive Dialogue Model (IDM), that significantly contribute to our understanding 
of performance information (Moynihan, 2008), there is more to learn. For example, in the decade 
since the IDM’s initial publication, we have developed several key insights into the phenomenon 
of interest. But, as a community, we have yet to adequately update our dominant models.  
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More recently, a new research program on the behavioral foundations of performance 
information use has contributed a rash of empirical evidence for how individuals process 
performance information. This behavioral turn has yielded important insights because, typically, 
scholarship on how public managers use performance information had relied on survey responses 
and self-reported information (Ammons & Rivenbark, 2008; Kroll, 2015a; Donald P. Moynihan, 
Poul A. Nielsen, & Alexander Kroll, 2017).1 Behavioral research often uses different 
methodologies and theoretical foundations from research based in organizational theory, allowing 
for different insights. Following this behavioral approach, I aim to contribute to the understanding 
of how public managers use performance information in two ways. First, I argue the information 
processing approach allows us to gain new leverage on the question of performance information 
use because it requires us to look at individual steps in the way that an individual processes, or 
make decisions about, information (Oppenheimer & Kelso, 2015). Second, I suggest the 
importance of the role of the interpretation of performance information as a cognitive step that 
creates subjectivity in the use of objective information generated by performance management 
systems (Gaines, Kuklinski, Quirk, Peyton, & Verkuilen, 2007). 
Insights into the psychological factors that influence how public managers process 
performance information may have implications for performance management. On the one hand, 
how public managers interpret performance information potentially influences how public 
managers “use” performance information. Current scholarship has not paid adequate attention to 
this important antecedent. On the other hand, an information processing approach, rooted in 
psychology, also suggests important limitations in dominant models of performance information 
use, such as the Interactive Dialogue Model (IDM). Specifically, while current models allow for 
                                                 
1 Typical approaches include single-city case studies, multicity surveys, and multicity case studies.  
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certain types of subjectivity—e.g., those arising from organizational factors—they cannot 
adequately incorporate well established cognitive biases in human decision making.  
I borrow a framework from political psychology on political information use to address 
this shortcoming (Gaines et al., 2007). The Gaines et al. framework of political information use 
consists of four cognitive processing models that seek to describe how individuals process 
information over multiple steps. Here, I offer a framework of how individuals process performance 
information, offering “awareness” and “interpretation” as distinct steps in how people process this 
type of information. I believe this will improve our ability to describe and predict. In short, this 
approach can help scholars interested in how individuals use performance information to develop 
theory in this area.  
As I will show in this essay, while individuals tend to be equally aware of the objective 
value of the performance information they observe, their interpretations are prone to cognitive 
biases that arise in large part from the way in which information is presented to them. That is, 
subjectivity arises specifically from the action and process of interpretation and not directly from 
the information itself nor in how individuals initially incorporate new information. Taken together, 
this model and relevant empirical findings allow for a better understanding of how the design of 
performance measurement systems can influence performance information use. Since empirical 
findings from the broader study of performance information use suggest there is value in updating 
the IDM, this framework can help students of public management begin to synthesize prevailing 
models with evidence from how individuals—citizens, politicians, or public managers—use 
performance information. 
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In this essay I empirically test the claim that individuals are objectively aware of the 
performance information they observe but the process of interpretation leads to subjectivity in 
performance information. This allows me to demonstrate the validity of the larger claim that it is 
the process of interpreting performance information, and not how individuals receive performance 
information, that is subject to cognitive bias.  
In what follows, I review scholarly work on performance information use. I emphasize the 
role of institutions and psychology in this research program. I also review and provide a discussion 
of Moynihan’s (2008) Interactive Dialogue Model, including its key assumptions. Subsequent 
empirical work suggests some potential ways to update the model. For example, I suggest how an 
understanding of human behavior, as well as recent experimental evidence on the study of 
performance information use, provide support for incorporating an information processing 
perspective into the IDM. Then, I point to work from Gaines and colleagues (2007) to potentially 
address these challenges and refine the larger IDM. I follow with a set of general propositions and 
specific hypotheses for ways in which cognitive biases can influence how individuals process 
performance information. I then provide empirical evidence for this framework. I conclude with a 
discussion of these results and by highlighting avenues of future research. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Performance Management Systems 
When it comes to the public sector, performance management regimes are everywhere. As 
one scholar noted, “the dissemination of quantitative measures of performance has been one of the 
most widespread trends in government in past decades” (Moynihan, 2015, 33). And, throughout 
the performance management movement, leading scholars have tried to direct attention to the 
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question of how public managers use performance information (Behn, 1995; D. P. Moynihan & S. 
K. Pandey, 2010). Yet, recently, a prominent scholar commented that “we know little about the 
basic tendency of individuals to incorporate and use performance information” (Moynihan, 2015, 
p. 33). If we endeavor to learn, and if we are to accept the claim that how public managers use 
performance information is an important question for public management researchers (D. P. 
Moynihan & S. K. Pandey, 2010), we must acknowledge some of the limitations of previous 
(Kroll, 2015a; Donald P. Moynihan et al., 2017).  
 
Institutions and Performance Information Use 
Early studies on public managers focused on the question of how aspects of the institutional 
environment drive performance information use. A recent systematic literature review of the use 
of performance information outlined some of the progress made in this area since 2000 (Kroll, 
2015a). In that time, in “a highly relevant and fast-growing research area” (ibid., 460), research 
consistently shows six factors commonly drive the use of performance information among 
bureaucrats: measurement system maturity (for examples see Berman & Wang, 2000; Ho, 2006; 
Taylor, 2009), stakeholder involvement (for examples see Bourdeaux & Chikoto, 2008; Ho, 2006; 
Donald P Moynihan & Sanjay K Pandey, 2010), leadership support (for examples see Moynihan 
& Ingraham, 2004; Moynihan & Lavertu, 2012; Yang & Hsieh, 2007), support capacity (for 
examples see Berman & Wang, 2000; Julnes & Holzer, 2001; Moynihan & Hawes, 2012), 
innovative culture (for examples see Moynihan, 2005; Donald P Moynihan & Sanjay K Pandey, 
2010; Moynihan, Pandey, & Wright, 2012b), and goal clarity (for examples see Moynihan & 
Landuyt, 2009; Moynihan, Pandey, & Wright, 2012a; Moynihan et al., 2012b). Thus, previous 
scholarship suggests that, as expected by institutional theory, the involvement of external 
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stakeholders influences if and how bureaucrats use performance information. Relevant to this 
study, a majority of previous studies focus on the ways in which the organizational context 
influences performance information use.  
 
An Interactive Dialogue Model 
In 2008, Moynihan laid out what he referred to as the “Interactive Dialogue Model” (IDM). 
This model describes how and why a public manager’s institutional context influences her use of 
performance information. Thus, the pre-eminent framework for understanding performance 
information use demonstrates the importance of institutions in understanding the subject. 
The foundation of this model is a view that performance management systems are decision 
making systems and performance management is a decision making problem. He defines 
performance management as “a system that generates performance information through strategic 
planning and performance measurement routines and that connects this information to decision 
venues, where, ideally, the information influences a range of possible decisions” (2008, p. 5). In 
this view of performance management systems, to understand how public managers use 
performance information, we must understand how they make decisions, about performance 
(information). 
While scholars have presented different takes on what it means to “use” performance 
information—see, for example, Behn (1995)—Moynihan (2008) suggests the purpose of use is 
ultimately to persuade. In line with the idea of persuasion as the aim of use, at the time of its 
publication, the most important contribution of the model was the idea that performance 
information could be subjective. For example, one essential element of the IDM is that 
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performance information can be subjective through deliberate persuasion. That is, public managers 
knowingly add subjectivity to performance information.  
Even more acutely, performance information can be ambiguous because of political 
considerations a priori to any descriptive story of performance information “use”. This idea of 
subjectivity is contrary to the performance management doctrine, representing a major break in 
the theoretical development of performance information use by public managers (Moynihan, 
2008). This last point helps us understand why the IDM came to provide the theoretical backdrop 
for a decade’s worth of research. But, as I will discuss later, subsequent research has demonstrated 
some potential limitations to this perspective 
 
Elements of the Model 
There are three fundamental elements of the model. They are: (1) performance information, 
(2) the individual decision maker (i.e., public managers), and (3) the environment(s) in which these 
other elements exist or operate. Here, environment is meant to imply both the organizations in 
which individuals work and the political environment(s) in which those individuals and 
organizations are situated. The model’s emphasis on organizational and environmental factors (see 
Moynihan 2008, p. 103) parallels many other studies in the research program (Kroll, 2015a). 
Taken together, these three elements shaped the way scholars studied performance 
information use over the last decade. Grounded in the logic of institutions, the IDM gives us a 
story in which institutions matter. Yet, the emphasis on institutions raises the question of what 
other elements might influence and help explain how public managers use performance 
information. One potential avenue of explanation is the relationship between performance 
information use and factors at the level of the individual (Kroll, 2015a). 
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Assumptions of the model 
There are six basic assumptions to the model (Moynihan, 2008, 102). First, performance 
information is not comprehensive. Second, performance information is ambiguous. Third, 
performance information is subjective. Fourth, the production of performance information does 
not guarantee use. Fifth, institutional affiliation and individual beliefs will affect selection, 
perception, and presentation of performance information. Sixth, the concept of dialogue will affect 
the ability to use performance information to develop solutions. 
 
Flow of the Model 
In this model, organizational and political factors influence performance information (use) 
in several ways. This includes, the presentation of performance information, whether an individual 
considers (i.e., “looks at”) performance information, how they interpret performance information, 
and, finally, how they “use” performance information. For anyone interested in studying how 
people “use” information, this seems like it could oversimplify how individuals interact with 
information.  
To be clear, the IDM assumes performance information is subjective because: (1) 
individuals can choose to present information subjectively, (2) even the act of considering 
performance information is, in and of itself, a choice, (3) individuals interpret performance 
information based upon organizational and political factors, and (4) individuals use performance 
information to strategically achieve organizational and personal objectives. These assumptions 
lead to a meta-assumption: “that simply because performance information exists, there is no 
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guarantee that it is used” (Moynihan, 2008, 102). I want to push on this meta-assumption because 
I think it oversimplifies how human beings process information in two key ways.  
First, I think it treats use as binary—either people use it, or they do not. Second, here, use is implied 
to be a discrete act. This idea of use is in line with early writings from Behn (1995). In this sense, 
use is an action taken whereupon said action has been informed by the performance information 
in question (Van Dooren & Van de Walle, 2011). In other words, to be adequately considered as 
performance information “use”, a decision maker must have looked at the performance data in 
question and both 1) become aware of the performance information and 2) updated (or not2) their 
interpretation of a policy area. The key assumption here is that once an individual decides to look 
at performance information that she and all others will incorporate and interpret that information. 
On one hand, characterizing use in this way facilitates observation. On the other, it does not seem 
to hold up to some basic assumptions from information processing theory (Oppenheimer & Kelso, 
2015). To clarify this last point, existing work makes critical—yet unstated—assumptions about 
how individuals process performance information. In fact, there is growing evidence of the value 
of incorporating an information processing approach when considering the subject of decision 
making. This general approach suggests basic models of cognition should form the basis for how 
we conceptualize human decision making. These models allow us to focus our attention on “how 
decision-relevant information is sampled, retrieved, and integrated” (Oppenheimer & Kelso, 2015, 
p. 283, 283). 
      
Psychology and the Subjectivity of Performance Information 
                                                 
2 This part could be flexible in a theoretical sense, but it is left unspecified in the IDM. 
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 Another reason performance information could be subjective can be found in the way that 
human beings process information. With the recent emphasis on developing a behavioral public 
administration, the contours of such an approach are already in place (Grimmelikhuijsen, Jilke, 
Leth Olsen, & Tummers, 2016). Additionally, some scholars have pointed to behavioral factors 
that might produce systematic variation in the use of performance information among bureaucrats 
(Kroll, 2015a; Donald P Moynihan, Poul Aaes Nielsen, & Alexander Kroll, 2017).  
While the IDM is largely bereft of psychology as an influence in the larger process of using 
performance information, it points to a potential role for psychology in a confirmation bias. For 
example, consider the following falsifiable hypothesis: “Different actors can examine the same 
performance information and come up with competing, though reasonable, arguments for what the 
information means” (2008, 113). Carrying on with this line of thinking, Moynihan says: 
“Performance information does not necessarily result in clearer 
decisions if the actors involved cannot agree on what it tells them 
about current performance, changing budgets, or management. As 
roles motivate the actors involved to understand performance 
information differently, the inherent ambiguity in performance 
information will be exploited.” (2008, 16-17). 
 
The preceding statement makes three key assumptions which should be explored in more 
detail. First, the selection of a piece of performance information is a deliberate (i.e., cognitive) act 
rising from one’s role. Second, there is a question about whether actors can even agree on what 
performance information tells them. This may arise from, among other things, uncertainties in the 
broader political environment. A third assumption is that astute political actors will deliberately 
exploit potential ambiguities of performance information through interpretation. These are key 
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assumptions of an important model in this literature. For this reason, I argue public management 
scholars should give more attention to these assumptions. 
In the model, because ambiguity arises through role, there is little space for other factors 
to contribute to subjectivity. Yet, recent empirical work suggests cognitive processes may also 
contribute to performance information’s ambiguity and subjectivity. The standard take on bounded 
rationality is that human beings have significant constraints on their ability to hold and process 
information. In the IDM, however, information overload leads individuals not to “try to process 
all information but select information that they find useful” rather than simply being unable to 
accurately process the information they have (Moynihan, 2008, 17). 
If we can learn from work on information processing and heuristics, there are several 
reasons to suggest why individuals respond differently to the same information (Gigerenzer & 
Gaissmaier, 2011; Oppenheimer & Kelso, 2015). And, many of these different interpretations arise 
not from deliberate cognitive processing but from a type of cognitive processing that relies on 
speedy, snap decisions. 
 
Behavioral Foundations of Performance Information Use: Empirical Evidence  
Recent empirical work suggests psychology may play a role in helping us understand how 
public managers use performance information (Andersen & Moynihan, 2016; Kroll, 2015b; 
Moynihan, 2008, 2015; Poul A Nielsen, 2013; Salge, 2011). Other studies suggest this perspective 
can contribute to our understanding of how individuals, broadly considered, respond to 
performance information. These include studies on citizens (Andersen & Hjortskov, 2015; 
Baekgaard & Serritzlew, 2016; Barrows, Henderson, Peterson, & West, 2016; Hvidman & 
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Andersen, 2016; Olsen, 2013, 2015a, 2017) and politicians (George, Desmidt, Nielsen, & 
Baekgaard, 2016; Poul A. Nielsen & Baekgaard, 2015; Poul A Nielsen & Moynihan, 2016; Olsen, 
2014). This approach should be understood within a broader context of seeking to understand the 
psychological foundations of public administration (Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2016). 
For our purposes, there are two important takeaways from these studies. First, experimental 
methods are a useful approach to develop our understanding of performance information use across 
a variety of political actors (Anderson & Edwards, 2015; Bouwman & Grimmelikhuijsen, 2016; 
James, Jilke, & Ryzin, 2017; Jilke, Van de Walle, & Kim, 2016; Donald P. Moynihan et al., 2017). 
Second, when it comes to performance metrics, these studies suggest that, depending upon the 
circumstances, individuals exhibit various cognitive biases and utilize several heuristics when 
responding to performance information. In short, evidence for cognitive bias in the use of 
performance information by various actors supports the value of taking an information processing 
approach (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Oppenheimer & Kelso, 2015). 
 
Motivated Reasoning 
One cognitive bias that has received some attention from public management scholars in 
recent years is motivated reasoning. It is now well established that “motivation may affect 
reasoning through reliance on a biased set of cognitive processes: strategies for accessing, 
constructing, and evaluating beliefs” (Kunda, 1990). Epley and Gilovich argue that our 
motivations potentially influence the way we process information in one of two ways (2016). First, 
our biases and preferences might lead us to avoid certain information or to emphasize other pieces 
of information. Second, once we have information, we are free to interpret how we like. 
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Public management scholars have only recently begun to try and understand the 
relationship between motivated reasoning and performance information use. One study shows how 
political motivations influence how political officials prioritize goals in the face of the information 
presented to them (Christensen, Dahlmann, Mathiasen, Moynihan, & Petersen, 2018). Another set 
of studies suggest that individuals’ motivations influence the way they interpret performance 
information (Baekgaard, Christensen, Dahlmann, Mathiasen, & Petersen, 2017; Baekgaard & 
Serritzlew, 2016; James & Van Ryzin, 2016). Unfortunately, none of the aforementioned studies 
adequately disentangle the question which arises from Epley and Gilovich—namely, do 
differences in interpretation exist because of deviations in acquiring or interpreting performance 
information? While Epley and Gilovich focus on motivated reasoning, scholars could ostensibly 
apply a wide array of cognitive biases to the question of if and how individuals acquire and 
interpret performance information. 
 
Present Stumbling Blocks 
I categorize our lack of understanding on this issue into three classes of assumptions. The 
first involves a set of assumptions we make about performance management systems and the 
information they create. Two that stand out as relevant to the current study are: 1) “Government 
can and should make more rational decisions”, and 2) “Performance information will improve 
decisions and can be used to foster accountability” (Moynihan, 2008, 27). The link between 
performance information and accountability through the quality of decisions made based upon this 
information rests on a further assumption about the information itself.  Performance data were 
originally thought to allow for an individual to make an objective assessment of how an 
organization is doing because it is intended to be “systematic” information (Poul Aaes Nielsen, 
2013; Radin, 2006). It’s often numerical format provides a “reassuring status of clarity and 
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objectivity” (Moynihan, 2008, 95). The promise of this story has led us to a point in which 
performance management systems are ubiquitous. Nonetheless, while performance management 
doctrine assumes bureaucrats will incorporate the performance information these systems create 
into their decision making, at this point there is sufficient empirical evidence to refute the basic 
assumptions listed here.  
The second class of assumptions involves the way we conceptualize how individuals 
respond to information and make decisions. That the study of human decision making has received 
a lot of scholarly attention is not surprising. Human beings use information to make decisions is 
one of the most important questions in the social sciences (Giles, 2011). One consequences of this 
is the ability to broadly define studies of human decision making as falling within one of two 
camps. The first second focuses on institutions, demonstrating that under many conditions, humans 
respond in predictable ways to these institutions. The second centers on the assumptions we make 
about individuals and how they process information. 
Third, what does it means to “use” performance information? Previous research seems to 
characterize use as a discrete act that follows from observing a performance metric (Behn, 2003; 
Moynihan, 2010; Van de Walle & Van Dooren, 2011; Van Dooren & Van de Walle, 2011). This 
is a critical assumption but one potential shortcoming is the way in which what happens at the 
micro-level is unobservable. An information processing approach gives scholars more theoretical 
leverage. It allows us to observe how individuals respond to performance information over 
multiple cognitive steps. For example, it allows us to observe whether or not individuals are 
actually “aware” of the information in question (and if so, how well) and, if so, how they 
“interpret” the information (Gaines et al., 2007). 
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An additional challenge for advancing theory is that progress thus far considers macro- and 
micro-level processes independent of one another. That is, studies of performance information use 
by public managers either incorporate an institutional or psychological perspective but not both. 
This is in line with a critique from Priem and colleagues about management studies, broadly 
construed. They suggested that “those individual judgment studies that have been performed by 
management researchers have almost always stayed within one level of analysis” (Priem, Walters, 
& Li, 2011, 554-555). One assumption advanced here is that to make progress on the basic question 
for performance information use by public managers, we must figure out how to integrate both the 
macro- and micro-level processes that work to shape the phenomenon.  
 
 
Institutions, Behavior, and Performance Information Use 
In the context of this discussion, I suggest two limitations to the IDM. First, more recent 
empirical evidence suggests other cognitive biases might influence the use of performance 
information. Second, there is an overreliance on role as an institutional variable. If we understand 
that the fundamental problem in public administration is that bureaucrats make public decisions 
that have public consequences, we must recognize that citizens and political officials use a 
multitude of tools to try use to constrain bureaucratic behavior (Bertelli & Lynn, 2006; Kenneth J. 
Meier & Bohte, 2007). While the IDM appears to offer the flexibility necessary to accommodate 
revisions in its assumptions of the role of behavior and institutions in how public managers use 
performance information, the model presently stands in need of a revision that offers a broader 
array of variables for public management scholars to consider. Here, I offer aspects of behavior—
reference points, framing effects, and negativity bias—and institutions—performance benchmarks 
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and justification requirements—as elements that might influence how public managers interpret 




Whether individuals are aware of political facts and how they form political opinions are 
fundamental questions in political science. Similarly, scholars of public management are interested 
in how well public managers understand the performance of their organization and if, and how, 
they use information regarding that performance. Additionally, accountability problems lead 
public management scholars to focus on how managers make public decisions. Ergo, citizens, 
political officials, public managers and scholars are all interested in the extent to which there is a 
connection between facts about public sector organizations and the decisions public managers 
make relating to that information. One approach from political psychology that may help to inform 
our understanding of how public managers use performance information considers how individuals 
move from facts about politics to political opinions (Gaines et al., 2007). 
 
Four Models of Political Information Use 
Gaines and colleagues (2007) suggest four models of processing political information in 
which a) objective information exists in the larger political environment, b) individuals become 
aware of the information, c) individuals must interpret the political information, and d) finally, 
individuals must arrive at policy positions. Their framework builds off work that seeks to 
understand “whether people update and what it means to update” (ibid., 958), which arose from a 
broader discussion over whether citizens were able to objectively update their policy views when 
new political information entered the environment (Gerber & Green, 1999; Gerber & Green, 1998) 
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while other work showed evidence of bias in policy views even after new information became 
publicly available (Bartels, 2002; Taber & Lodge, 2006). 
According to Gaines and colleagues (2007), the interpretation of political information plays 
an important role in moving from political fact to political opinion because interpretation 
represents the step in the cognitive process where individuals give meaning to political 
information. In more colloquial terms, motivated reasoning makes partisanship a strong drug that 
significantly influences the way that individuals look at—i.e., interpret—political information 
(Kunda, 1990; Taber & Lodge, 2006). But, they did not advance this same expectation about the 
ability of individuals to acquire new political information and be aware of it. That is, they did not 
expect that partisanship influences an individual’s ability to accurately update their understanding 
of political facts.  
More recently, the question of information acquisition has interested scholars because of 
the discussions of “alternative facts” and “fake news” in the broader political environment. And, 
as suggested by (Epley & Gilovich, 2016), there is some evidence that motivated reasoning does 
in fact influence how individuals receive and update on political facts (Hochschild & Einstein, 
2015; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010; Schaffner & Roche, 2016; Yeo, Cacciatore, & Scheufele, 2015). 
Without a doubt, the role of bias is an important question in the acquisition and awareness of 
political information. And, scholars of public management should also inquire about the factors 
that lead to deviations in the acquisition process when considering performance information. Yet, 
when Gaines et al. (2007) demonstrate empirically that cognitive bias influences how individuals 
process political information between steps “b” and “c”, they provide evidence that cognitive 
biases can arise from the broader cognitive process of interpretation rather than awareness or 
information uptake. 
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 I expect awareness after information acquisition to be considerably less susceptible to the 
influence of cognitive bias for performance information than for political information. This 
expectation arises because, at least ostensibly, performance information is objective in a way that 
political information inherently is not; despite the objections about the objectivity of performance 
information, the original intention of performance management systems was to create measures of 
performance that accurately and adequately captured the function in question. For example, telling 
someone 75% of students passed a Math exam in a school or that 86% of residents expressed 
satisfaction with a city’s road maintenance efforts is likely to invoke less partisan or ideological 
filtering than telling an individual that 97% of scientists agree with the anthropogenic causes of 
climate change. As such, I expect the model of performance information processing which 
emphasizes how cognitive bias can influence the interpretation, rather than acquisition of, 
performance information (Model 3, discussed below), represents the best model for understanding 
how individuals (e.g., public managers) process performance information. In the following section, 
I modify the Gaines et al. framework to apply to performance information processing. 
 
A Framework of Performance Information Processing 
If we consider the similarities between political information and performance 
information—namely, they are information—then the Gaines framework could apply to 
performance information use (by citizens, political officials, and public managers) as well. Ergo, 
how public managers interpret performance information might have an important effect on the 
decisions they make.  
As it stands, the concept of interpretation plays a role in the IDM when 1) managers choose 
to consider information or 2) how they might spin performance information to the benefit of their 
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organization. But, the IDM does not consider how individuals interpret performance information 
in line with the experimental evidence which suggests the role of cognitive bias in the use of 
performance information. Thus, it does not consider the role of information processing in how 
managers interpret performance information. Let’s suppose a manger wants to consider and then 
use performance information. What might this process look like? 
Table 1 shows an adapted version of the four models of information updating proposed by 
Gaines and colleagues (2007)—I suggest referring to them individually as performance 
information processing models or jointly as the Performance Information Processing Framework 
(PIPF). The models have been adapted to portray four steps of the updating process for 
performance information use. First, I discuss the different steps and then I discuss the four models 
which describe different processes of performance information use. 
The first step represents the raw performance metric; a manager sees performance 
information. In the second step the manager becomes aware of the metric; they can recall the 
information they just saw. In the third step, a manager interprets the information; the manager 
gives meaning to the performance information and updates their belief about an organization’s 
performance. Finally, the manager decides to undertake some action based upon this information; 




In Model 1, complete updating, there is a smooth transition from performance information, 
to awareness, to interpretation, to use. That is, if a manager sees new information which is contrary 
to her original understanding of the performance of the organization (Kenneth J Meier, Favero, & 
Zhu, 2015), she becomes aware of it and interprets that information in a way that accurately reflects 
that information. In this case, we would expect her to recall and then provide an interpretation that 
matches or is at least very similar to the performance information she saw. The information is then 
used in a way that reflects smooth cognitive transitions from step one to steps two and then three.  
Model 1, complete understanding, reflects early thinking on performance information use, 
which Moynihan refers to as the performance management doctrine (2008). In other words, for 
many people this would probably be the normatively preferred model of performance information 
use. But, previously discussed empirical evidence from experimental work suggests some form of 
deviation from this ideal—in all three groups of users. So, we must look to some other descriptive 
model to help us understand how public managers process performance information. A model of 
cognitive processing allows us to pinpoint where, both in a descriptive and a causal sense, the 
potential sources of variation arise. 
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 In Model 2, fact avoidance, managers see performance information but do not update 
their awareness of what that information was. Gaines and colleagues say some conditions which 
might lead to fact avoidance are “willful or accidental ignorance” or “if changing conditions 
create mental discomfort” (2007, 960). These circumstances might lead people to simply pay less 
attention to reports of performance changes. In the case of performance management, this might 
be when a public manager is deeply invested in a project that is being evaluated negatively or if 
they get information that is drastically different than their worldview. The examples I investigate 
in this project should not lead to those kinds of cognitive conditions or challenges but this could 
be an area of interest to scholars in the future.  
In Model 3, meaning avoidance, managers see performance information and become aware 
of it but do not change their interpretation of the information. That is, the way they interpret the 
information does not flow smoothly from the newly acquired information itself. Gaines et al. 
(2007) illustrated this model to demonstrate the role of partisanship in how Americans interpreted 
the Iraq War. Even though co-partisans representing the two predominant U.S. political parties 
were aware of the increase in troop casualties, Republican co-partisans (with a Republican as the 
sitting-President) interpreted the increase in casualties to be less severe than Democratic co-
partisans. They suggest that motivated reasoning or reference biases might represent cognitive 
biases that lead to meaning avoidance. I also argue there are a wide number of cognitive biases 
that might affect the way that public managers interpret performance information. 
In Model 4, “Use” disconnect, managers would become aware and then interpret the 
performance information but would ultimately not use it in a way that flows smoothly from the 
interpretation stage. This could happen for a variety of reasons—some individual, others 




General Behavioral Expectations 
In the Interactive Dialogue Model, subjectivity arises from a cognitive bias—motivated 
reasoning—that arises from a public manager’s role within a public sector organization.  Here, I 
argue that public managers may exhibit cognitive biases—e.g., responses to reference points—
simply because of the way information is presented to them.  I also offer that certain accountability 
tools—performance benchmarks and decision justification requirements—should moderate these 
biases under appropriate conditions.  In short, public managers may interpret ostensibly objective 
performance information in a subjective way that simply reflects the use of different points of 
reference.   
The labels “System 1” and “System 2” are used to describe two very different cognitive 
processes (Kahneman, 2011).  System 1 processing reflects an unconscious action where human 
beings use heuristics to think fast, make many associations, and generally process as much 
information as possible.  System 2 processing, on the other hand, is more deliberate, more 
“rational”.  In this mode, individuals undertake more time and effort to consciously undertake a 
more reliable decision making process.  While the IDM focuses on motivated reasoning, other 
research on the use of performance information suggests that cognitive bias can be observed when 
individuals exhibit System 1 processing. 
In a broad sense, I expect that when presented with situations that reflect the biases 
discussed herein, public managers will tend to exhibit System 1 thinking.  That is, public managers 
will respond to reference points in a way that reflects System 1 thinking.  I believe these effects 
will increase in the context of a performance benchmark but decrease when public managers are 
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asked to provide a justification of their decisions.  Evidence for these biases will come when public 
managers respond to qualitatively equivalent information in substantively different ways.  That is, 
evidence a cognitive bias will be present when public managers interpret the same performance 
information in different ways when the only difference is the way that information is presented to 
them. 
As a caveat, these expectations may depend on the scale of a comparison being made or 
some other artifact of the interpretative process.  That is, the hypothesis in this type of behavioral 
research is not that everyone will exhibit the cognitive bias in question but that a statistically 
distinct percentage of individuals will exhibit the bias. 
 
Reference Points and Cognitive Bias 
The preceding discussion relies heavily on the idea that reference points will serve as a 
significant component of the way that public managers will interpret performance information.  In 
the following discussion, I expect reference points will help to facilitate System 1 thinking and 
cognitive bias because individuals will consider the performance metric in the context of some 
reference point rather than as an objective measure. 
 
Reference Points 
Reference points are “stimuli of known attributes that act as standards against which other 
categorically similar stimuli of unknown attributes are compared in order to gain information” 
(Yockey & Kruml, 2009, 97).  Reference points represent a significant part of our cognitive 
processing because our judgment is fundamentally comparative in nature (Mussweiler, 2003).  
That is due to the fact that our perception is “reference-dependent” (Kahneman, 2002, 459, 
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emphasis in original).  And, the way we fixate on reference points tends to add a level of 
subjectivity to the way we interpret decisions and events around us.   
Some argue that public managers will use comparisons in how they think about 
performance (Kenneth J Meier et al., 2015; Olsen, 2015b).  Others provide evidence to suggest of 
this (Ammons & Rivenbark, 2008; Askim, Johnsen, & Christophersen, 2007; Hammerschmid, 
Van de Walle, & Stimac, 2013; P. A. Nielsen, 2014).  Nonetheless, questions pertaining to the 
importance of reference points in how bureaucrats use performance information remain largely 
unexplored.   
 
Institutional Activators of Cognitive Bias 
My expectation is that the influence of these well-established cognitive biases on the 
interpretation of performance information can itself be influenced by institutional (i.e., macro) 
characteristics. We know that organizations do not present information in a vacuum, but instead 
require that managers use performance information to make certain comparisons with that 
information. Very often those comparisons are dictated by previously determined levels of 
acceptable performance, which are determined by levels of performance in similar organizations. 
These types of comparison are commonly known as benchmarking. In addition to benchmarking, 
some performance management systems require managers to justify their interpretation of and 
reactions to performance information. These accountability systems are meant to ensure 
productive feedback processes and allow agency leaders and/or political principals to monitor and 
better understand the use of performance information. This section will briefly discuss the 
literature on the potential impacts of these institutional features on System 1 vs. System 2 thinking 




Simply stated, benchmarking is, “The process of comparing performance across 
organizations” (Bouckaert & Van Dooren, 2009 156).  It comes in two forms (Löffler, 2001).  
Absolute benchmarking occurs when predefined standards of performance lead to a “pass-fail” 
approach to understanding organizational performance.  In this way, any organization (or 
individual) can “pass” a benchmark.  On the other hand, relative benchmarks require competition 
between comparable organizations.  Here, our focus is on absolute benchmarks. 
 
Justifications 
It is well known that while political officials need administrators to undertake actions on 
their behalf, they are motivated to constrain bureaucratic behavior towards producing a set of 
decisions and results that are more favorable to their preferences (Seidenfeld, 1996, 2001; William 
F. West, 1995; William F West, 2004).  One tool that is commonly used to constrain bureaucratic 
behavior is the need to explain—to justify—ex-post, the motivations and reasoning behind a 
particular bureaucratic action.  This has been said to affect the underlying psychology of 
bureaucratic behavior (i.e., decision making) because it “encourages agencies to take greater care 
when formulating rules, which in turn decreases the likelihood that the rulemaking process will 





I pre-registered this study and the following expectations with the Evidence in Governance and 
Politics (EGAP) group, application ID: 20180425AD. 
 
Expectations Arising from the Performance Information Processing Framework 
Using the logic of the Performance Information Processing Framework, as well as recent 
empirical findings on the behavioral foundations of performance information use, I put forward 
the following general hypothesis: when faced with performance information, public managers will 
process that information in a way that deviates from the “complete updating” performance 
information processing model. In the past, systematic deviations from rationality in the assessment 
of performance information have generally been “the bar” of evidence necessary for claiming that 
cognitive bias influences the way that individual’s use of performance information. Now, the PIPF 
allows us to move beyond this limitation and to specify where in the cognitive process these biases 
arise. 
Evidence of the role of cognitive bias in the processing of performance information could 
come in three forms. First, individuals might not adequately update their awareness of the objective 
information (i.e., fact avoidance). Second, if they hold an accurate awareness of what the 
performance information is, they may simply interpret it in a way that diverges from a smooth 
transition from step 2 to step 3 (i.e., meaning avoidance). Third, if there are no deviations from the 
original information after individuals interpret it, other factors could lead individuals to use it in a 
way that does not align with the considered performance information (i.e., “use disconnect”). 
Finally, role, or other organizational factors, could be one example of a factor that might lead to 
use disconnect. While future research should investigate this step in the Performance Information 
Processing Framework, for the remainder of this essay the emphasis is on Model 2 and Model 3.  
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The Gaines et al. framework suggests that Model 3, meaning avoidance, will have the best 
descriptive power of these models. Similarly, I expect that when given performance information, 
public managers will be able to accurately recall—i.e., they can demonstrate an “awareness” of—
previously observed performance information but that these same individuals, faced with the same 
conditions and performance information of which they are aware, will be prone to exhibit cognitive 
biases when asked to interpret this information.  
H1: When faced with performance information in the context of performance 
benchmarks and justification requirements, public managers will be able to 




I expect that performance benchmarks will set the reference points that public managers 
use to determine if current performance is above or below acceptable levels.  That is, even though 
benchmarks often represent a type of institution designed to increase accountability in line with 
the assumptions of the performance management doctrine, the fact that benchmarks lead 
individuals to undergo the same type of comparative assessments discussed previously suggests 
they might contribute to the subjectivity of performance information.  For this reason, I expect that 
performance benchmarks will serve to induce System 1 processing; we should expect to see public 
managers exhibit cognitive bias in their interpretations of performance information in the presence 
of performance benchmarks. 
 
H2: Benchmarks will drive respondents to provide higher (lower) performance 




Finally, in line with Seidenfeld’s comments on bureaucratic decision making in the 
rulemaking process (Seidenfeld, 1996, 2001), I expect the need to justify will induce System 2 
thinking.  The expectation is that having to justify one’s thoughts will lead public managers to 
undergo a more deliberate thought process when considering performance information.  Ergo:  
H3: I expect public managers will be less prone to exhibit psychological biases 
when they are asked to justify their thought processes. 
 
DATA AND EMPIRICS 
Empirical evidence to test these hypotheses come from two related experiments run during 
the same survey. I ask individuals to interpret performance information and then, at a later point 
in the survey, respond to a question asking them to name the raw performance metric they saw. In 
this way, I can manipulate the temporal stages of the Performance Information Processing 
Framework to test the validity of the meaning avoidance model. 
 
Data Collection 
I used surveys to collect data for this experiment in three phases. Individuals were paid for 
their participation in all phases. I designed data collection instruments for each phase using 
Qualtrics. I utilized TurkPrime (www.turkprime.com) as a third-party platform to collect data from 
Workers on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). TurkPrime offers researchers both greater 
flexibility and control over the design and implementation of online, crowdsourced research 
(Litman, Robinson, & Abberbock, 2016). 
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In the first phase, I ran a short survey that allowed me to screen respondents in two ways. 
First, respondents were asked to select the sector that best described their primary employment. 
Possible responses included: private for-profit, private not-for-profit, public, and N/A (e.g., 
unemployed, out of the workforce, etc.). I provided representative examples in case the sector type 
would confuse anyone. In addition to this question, I also asked individuals if they had ever worked 
in each of the three sectors. Respondents could select “yes” or “no” to specific (individual) 
questions about each sector. If they selected “yes”, respondents then saw an additional question in 
which they provided a numerical response for the number of years they worked in the respective 
sector. 5342 unique individuals completed this screening phase. Individuals passed as 
preliminarily qualified if they indicated they currently worked in the public sector or that they had 
at least five years of work experience in the public sector. Of these, individuals were disqualified 
for the following reasons: beeline responses (e.g., people indicated they had worked five years in 
each sector), 50 or more years of experience in any sector, 60 or more years of combined 
experience, and anyone who first indicated they worked in the public sector but then later indicated 
they had never worked in the public sector. 1202 individuals met these qualifications.  
I then sent a second survey to these 1202 individuals. This survey included demographic 
items and scales for the Big 5 personality items and public service motivation. Yet, the real 
motivation behind this phase was to try and screen out those who passed the first phase of the 
survey but were not in our population of interest—people with significant public sector work 
experience; especially, public managers. Someone could easily provide inconsistent answers over 
time. Individuals might lie in one of the two phases because they believe they know what the 
researchers are looking for. Or, because multiple individuals use the same MTurk account. I 
undertook this effort in the hope that I could make a stronger claim about the respondents. I 
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received 773 responses from this wave. Of these, 479 met the qualifications through both waves 
of the survey. These were the potential respondents who were notified of the opportunity to 
undertake this survey experiment. 
 
Experimental Design 
Respondents were asked to provide a response to a vignette about business satisfaction 
rates. In this experiment, I was interested in the role of performance benchmarks and justifications 
as potential moderators for how individuals process performance information. Table 2 shows the 
group assignments across these two treatment conditions. Ultimately, the experiment had a 2x2 
factorial design with individuals randomly assigned to one of four groups: (Group 1) control, 
(Group 2) justification, (Group 3) benchmark, and (Group 4) benchmark and justification. 
 
 
All individuals saw this prompt:  
For this question, imagine that you are the manager of a business 
development office for a major metropolitan area. Your city just 
released its yearly performance metrics and, based on this 
information, the mayor wants to know how you think the city 
performed over the course of the last year. For some time, business 
owners were asked whether they were generally satisfied or 
generally dissatisfied with the city as a place to do business. In 2011, 
57% of business owners indicated they were satisfied with the city 
as a place to do business. The mayor has tasked your office with 
improving the business climate in the city.  
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Individuals in the benchmark groups also saw this sentence at the end of the prompt:  
The goal has been to increase the percentage of business owners 
satisfied with doing business in the city to 67%.  
 
All individuals saw a randomly generated performance rating which indicated that between 
62% and 72% of business owners were satisfied with the city as a place of doing business over the 
past year. Randomizing the observed performance metric is an important component of this test. 
It allows us to gain a better understanding of how individuals process performance information 
across a range of potential performance metrics. This also allows us to use a stationary benchmark.  
All individuals were asked to assess the performance of the city as a place of doing business 
for the past year (based on the data they saw). This became the dependent variable for the 
interpretation experiment.  All individuals had an equal probability of seeing a value that was a) 
less than the benchmark (5/11), b) equal to the benchmark (1/11), or c) greater than the benchmark 
(5/11). (Note, the first two groups do not see the benchmark.) Half of the respondents also need to 
justify their performance assessment. All respondents who will justify their responses are told they 
will have to perform this task before they see the raw performance metric. 
Then, at a later point in the survey, individuals were asked to provide the raw performance 
metric they observed in this experiment. This response became the dependent variable of interest 





Table 3 provides the means and standard deviation for the value respondents provided for 
the performance metric they observed. Note, the mean for all respondents was 62.92 but the 
randomized metric individuals saw had a range of 62-72. I also provide an assessment of the 
percentage of individuals within each group who listed the exact performance metric they saw. I 
conducted a one-way ANOVA to determine if the stated value of the observed performance metric 
(randomized between 62-72) was different across four (a control and three treatment) groups. 
There was not a statistically significant difference in the reported value of the observed 
performance metric across these groups as determined by one-way ANOVA (F(3,350) = 0.56, p = 
0.64). This test passed Bartlett’s test for equal variances χ2(3) = 6.2108, p = 0.102. 
 
 
 In addition to the one-way ANOVA, I also ran an OLS regression that included the 
dependent variable (value provided), the original raw performance metric, the individual’s 
treatment group, and the outcome score (i.e., the “interpretation” value). This was meant as a 
harder test. Of note, only the observed satisfaction variable (i.e., the raw performance metric) was 
statistically significant in the regression model. These results are in Table 4. Taken together, these 
two tests suggest there is no difference in the level of awareness that individuals had based upon 
randomization. So, any differences between the groups in their interpretations must come from 





Beyond these base checks, I wanted to run a more robust check by comparing all the groups 
against one another. Those results can be found in Table 5 where I looked at both one-way 
ANOVA and standard deviation tests for the awareness check across the groups. None of the one-
way ANOVA tests showed statistically distinct responses between the groups. Although, one 
comparison of standard deviation was statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level and another at 
the p < 0.1 level. These results appear to be driven by respondents in Group 4 which saw the 
performance benchmark and the justification requirement. This group had the highest mean but 





 Here, I also present evidence on how individuals in this experiment interpreted the 
performance information they saw. A one-way ANOVA on the assessed organizational 
performance (i.e., interpretation) showed evidence for a statistically significant relationship for the 
randomized group assignment (F(3(350) = 12.31, p = 0.0000). Since we know respondents did not 
show any statistically distinct patterns in their ability to recall performance information after they 
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were asked to interpret it, these results allow us to confidently say that the randomized group 
assignment influenced how individuals assessed performance through their interpretations of 
qualitatively similar performance metrics but not in their ability to acquire and be aware of this 
same information. This is significant evidence in support of Model 3, the meaning avoidance 
performance information model.  
Seeing evidence that treatment groups influenced the way individuals assessed 
performance, the next steps will uncover the reasons for those differences.  The three variables of 
interest are 1) whether the respondent saw a performance benchmark (67% satisfaction), 2) 
whether the respondent was told they would need to justify their response, and 3) the observed 
satisfaction value (which was also randomized).  The first two assume that the treatment group 
matters and that it influences how respondents process the observed satisfaction metric.  Together, 
these three allow me to tease out why there are differences in how the groups assessed 
performance. 
Table 7 communicates the most important information about the interpretation experiment.  
At the treatment level, it compares within both the benchmark and justification treatments.  It also 
compares at the group level, showing which relationships are statistically distinct from one 
another.  All tests of significance in this table were either one-way ANOVA or standard deviation 
tests, respectively.  The importance of the performance benchmark treatment clearly stands out in 
this table.   
Broadly, if I look at each treatment class as a binary variable, both treatments appear to 
provide statistically significant differences between those who saw the treatment and those who 
did not.  In the benchmark treatment, those who did not see the benchmark had a mean performance 
assessment of 67.06 while those who saw the performance benchmark provided a mean response 
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of 73.98.  This is a difference of almost seven points and significant at the p < 0.01 level.  The 
difference for those who saw the justify treatment was 2.84 points (No, 69.14; Yes, 71.98) and 
statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level.  Moving on to the groups, the mean performance 
assessments for both Group 3 and Group 4 (benchmark groups) were statistically different than 
their respective non-benchmark comparisons.  But, when I look at the justify treatment, it was only 
significant within the benchmark treatment.  That is, without the benchmark, respondents did not 
interpret performance any differently depending on whether they would need to justify their 
performance assessment.  This finding suggests some limitations to a need to justify performance 




Moving on to an analysis of how respondents processed specific performance metrics, three 
separate one-way ANOVA tests suggest a statistically significant difference between the observed 
satisfaction variable and the performance assessment respondents provided; in the full sample 
(F(10(343)) = 6.49, p = 0.0000), in the sub-sample that did not see a performance benchmark 
(F(10(165)) = 3.62, p = 0.0000), and in the benchmark sub-sample (F(10(167)) = 4.19, p = 0.0000).  
Knowing this, I can dig a little deeper into how respondents processed different performance 
metrics. 
F Prob > F f Pr (F>f)
No 67.06 12.22 0.92 176
Yes 73.98 12.71 0.95 178
No 69.14 13.30 0.99 180
Yes 71.98 12.39 0.94 174
F Prob > F f Pr (F>f)
66.92 12.81 1.37 88
71.27 13.48 1.41 92
67.20 11.67 1.24 88
76.87 11.19 1.21 86
F Prob > F f Pr (F>f)
66.92 12.81 1.37 88
67.20 11.67 1.24 88
71.27 13.48 1.41 92
76.87 11.19 1.21 86
F Prob > F f Pr (F>f)
66.92 12.81 1.37 88
76.87 11.19 1.21 86
1 29.72 0.0000 1.31 0.2124
4
Control vs Both Treatments
Group Mean Std. Dev. Std. Err. ANOVA SD Test N
3 9.02 0.0031 1.45 0.0835
4
1 0.02 0.8780 1.20 0.3865
2
By Treatment Group (focus Justify)
Group Mean Std. Dev. Std. Err. ANOVA SD Test N
2 31.07 0.0000 1.09 0.6981
4
N
1 4.92 0.0279 0.90 0.6322
3
Group Mean Std. Dev. Std. Err. ANOVA SD Test
By Treatment Group (focus Benchmark)
N
Benchmark 27.22 0.0000 0.92 0.6050




Variable Group Mean Std. Dev. Std. Err. ANOVA SD Test
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Table 8 shows the substantive differences in the means of three different sub-groups based 
upon the performance metric their respondents saw in relation to the performance benchmark 
(note, this only pertains to Group 3 and Group 4).  These data appear to show that the justification 
prompt led respondents in Group 4 to provide higher performance assessments compared to Group 
3 (this was contrary to the initial expectation that a justification requirement would induce System 
2 thinking and thus reduce cognitive bias [i.e., the role of the performance benchmark as a 
reference point]).  For example, respondents in Group 4 provided a mean performance assessment 
more than 5 points larger than those who saw the same information in Group 3 but were not asked 
to make a justification of the performance assessment. 
 
Table 9 shows results for group means and standard deviations for the full sample and two 
sub-samples: those who did not see the performance benchmark and those who did.  This provides 
more granularity in my comparisons of the role of the performance benchmark.  I will discuss a 
few points that stand out from this table before moving on to another discussion of statistical 
significance.  First, broadly, I have even more detailed evidence that respondents assessed 
performance differently if they saw a performance benchmark.  For example, if I look at those who 
saw an observed value of 67, those who saw this in the context of the performance benchmark 
reported a mean performance of more than five points higher than the group that did not see a 
performance benchmark.  Additionally, in the benchmark sub-sample, a performance metric of 67 
appears to be an inflection point.  But, in the sub-sample that did not see the benchmark the first 
observed value that produced a statistically different interpretation from other values within this 
Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N
Less than 68.85 12 82 67.96 13.56 46 70 9.72 36
Equal to 71.00 14.06 16 65.1 11.59 10 80.83 12.86 6
Greater than 79.83 10.63 80 77.22 11.83 36 81.95 9.12 44
Total 73.98 12.71 178 71.27 13.48 92 76.87 11.19 86
Table 8 - Mean Performance Assessment Relative to Performance Benchmark
Relation to 
Benchmark
Full Sample (Groups 3 and 4) Group 3 Group 4
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sub-sample was ‘70’.  This may actually suggest respondents were responding to another cognitive 
bias that can influence the processing of performance information, a left-most digit bias (Olsen, 
2013).  Additionally, the fact that the first significantly different observed value was higher in the 





 The experiments in this study are meant to open our understanding of where it is in the 
cognitive process of performance information use that cognitive bias may influence the way that 
public managers use performance information. To my knowledge, this questions has remained 
unexplored in the performance management literature.  
 Previous scholarship on performance information use by public managers can be 
characterized into two camps. A majority of this work adopts an organizational theory perspective 
Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N
65.60 9.66 35 61.67 7.70 18 69.76 9.97 17
65.66 11.26 35 64.70 11.43 20 66.93 11.30 15
65.50 12.89 30 59.67 15.27 12 69.39 9.62 18
65.60 13.65 40 61.35 11.80 20 69.85 14.32 20
67.96 12.96 23 68.45 9.89 11 67.50 15.70 12
68.18 14.84 34 65.67 15.45 18 71.00 14.06 16
72.76 12.04 37 66.29 10.59 17 78.25 10.54 20
72.33 11.77 24 68.54 13.10 13 76.82 8.47 11
78.24 10.88 29 76.18 11.98 11 79.50 10.30 18
79.43 10.26 28 74.07 6.86 15 85.62 10.22 13
76.56 10.88 39 74.00 9.36 21 79.56 12.00 18
70.54 12.92 354 67.06 12.22 176 73.98 12.71 178
Mean performance assessment for respondents who saw the respective business satisfaction value.  Table includes 
means for the whole sample and sub-samples split by whether respondents saw a performance benchmark.  
Performance benchmark (67) variable shown in italics. For each sub-sample, the first between-group statistical 
























and is highlighted by Moynihan’s Interactive Dialogue Model, one of the leading models that 
scholars use to think about how public managers use performance information. Another growing 
body of scholarship highlights the role of psychology in explaining how public managers use 
performance information. Unfortunately, to date, little scholarship has attempted to speak across 
these two bodies of work. 
 Following a framework of political information use put forward by Gaines and colleagues 
(2007), I offer the Performance Information Processing Framework (PIPF). In this framework, the 
acts of being “aware” of performance information—that is, accurately knowing what the 
information is or says—and interpreting the performance information, represent distinct steps in 
which cognitive biases may influence the way that individuals (i.e., public managers) process and 
eventually use performance information. Following this framework, cognitive processing might 
influence the way that public managers use performance information. Accordingly, my expectation 
was that the act of interpreting performance information might be prone to the influence of 
cognitive bias.  
I found considerable evidence that respondents were equally “aware” of the information 
they viewed. While there was variation in the ability of respondents to accurately recall the exact 
performance metric they saw across the three experiments, I found little evidence of any 
statistically significant relationship between a respondent’s treatment condition and their response 
when requested to recall the performance information in question. This suggests that framing 
manipulations that were intended to elicit various cognitive biases have little influence on a 
respondent’s ability to know what the information is. Further, any evidence for variation in the 
interpretations of the performance information observed in these experiments across experimental 
frames should point to the process of interpretation as being the step in the cognitive processing 
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of performance information in which individuals are most likely to exhibit cognitive biases. These 
results provide experimental evidence in support of part of this framework. This can help 
management scholars explain how and why public managers use performance information.  
The PIPF and these findings suggest the importance of incorporating behavioral 
explanations into our frameworks and models of how we conceptualize how individuals interact 
with performance information. Also, this work acknowledges the potential for other and future 
studies to explore what it means to “use” performance information. To expand on these points, a 
behavioral perspective potentially suggests that performance information use means something 
different than has been previously considered in the literature. One insight this perspective might 
provide to public management scholars, is that researchers would need to be more deliberate in 
how they theorize about the act of performance information use. Is there a direct link between 
interpretation and the use stage, as the PIPF suggests? Does this depend on the type—i.e., 
persuasion or making financial decisions for one’s organization—of use? 
 
Limitations  
 In addition to the contributions of this study, there are some limitations which merit further 
discussion. To begin, as this is experimental work, the usual caveats pertaining to the 
generalizability of findings to what happens in practice apply. Though, if we accept the PIPF and 
the approach undertaken herein, it is also worth mentioning how future scholarship might be able 
to extend some of the theoretical limitations of this body of scholarship. What might these be? 
First, how well does the PIPF capture moving from interpretation to use? It could be that 
there are other cognitive stages that might influence how public managers use performance 
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information. This should be explored in future research. Second, how might incorporating 
organizational theory influence the PIPF? In addition to the previous point, it could very well be 
that institutional factors in the organizational or political environment (including and in addition 
to one’s organizational role) could influence how individuals process information under certain 
conditions. Relatedly, it might be that organizational factors influence what steps in the PIPF are 
relevant to the circumstances of a public manager’s decision making process beyond an 
experimental setting. This logic is already deeply rooted in the IDM. 
Third, and relatedly, how well can the framework be incorporated into the Interactive 
Dialogue Model? The primary critique of the IDM this study raised was that despite the 
contributions and value of the IDM, there remain limitations to the model. I believe the 
experimental findings presented here will be of interest to scholars working in this area because of 
how the findings point to the value of looking for behavioral mechanisms of our empirical findings. 
Yet, how well does the PIPF fit into the IDM? Or, should scholars consider it as a standalone 
framework with four distinct models that potentially describe performance information use under 
different conditions? I personally feel the IDM is robust enough to accommodate the few changes 
in assumptions necessary to integrate the PIPF into the larger IDM framework. To this point, I 
could have offered up the PIPF as a distinct perspective. While this may have led to some amount 
of scholarship interested in this perspective, I felt it was antithetical to the larger intellectual project 
of trying to understand how public managers use performance information. In this sense, I think 




 In recent years, public management scholars have given significant attention to the question 
of how individuals, including public managers, use performance information. Despite some 
theoretical markers for how to think about this area of research, more effort has been given to 
describing the subject through empirical work. For this reason, there is a need for public 
management scholars to seek to develop our understanding of how individuals use performance 
information in a way that combines theoretical and empirical work from the past two decades. This 
essay seeks to do this by combining the Interactive Dialogue Model as a framework for thinking 
about how public managers use performance information and the recent empirical work that 
demonstrates the behavioral foundations of performance information use. I present a framework—
the performance information processing framework (PIPF)—that seeks to describe the cognitive 
process of performance information use over four distinct cognitive processing models. I believe 
this framework can be fully incorporated into the Interactive Dialogue Model with only slight 
modifications to the assumptions of the IDM. 
 A growing body of empirical evidence suggests cognitive biases can play a significant role 
in how individuals use performance information. Yet, heretofore, we have had a limited 
understanding of a) why that is, b) when it occurs, or c) how we might be able to design 
performance management systems in a way that mitigates these biases. The PIPF and the empirical 
results found in this essay help to uncover some of those mysteries. Specifically, I show that 
individuals, at least in an experimental setting, show similarities in understanding what the 
performance information they see says. Thus, any evidence for differences in assessments of 
performance information will likely come from the process of interpreting the raw performance 
information. That is, cognitive bias is most likely to influence individuals not in their ability to 
know what performance information is, but in their ability to interpret what it says. 
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 Finally, this research should speak to students of behavioral public administration in 
several ways. First, it should highlight the need and value in looking at behavioral mechanisms as 
framework for thinking about how to incorporate psychological insights into public management 
scholarship. Second, it suggests that theorizing about behavioral constructs and processes may 
offer a bevy of opportunities to better understand our phenomena of interest. Third, when it comes 
to public management, more effort is needed in understanding how the interplay of behavioral and 
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(XX% signifies a randomly 
generated performance 
metric.)
For some time, business owners were asked whether they were generally 
satisfied or generally dissatisfied with the city as a place to do business. In 
2011, 57% of business owners indicated they were satisfied with the city as a 
place to do business.  The mayor has tasked your office with improving the 
business climate in the city.
For some time, business owners were asked whether they were generally 
satisfied or generally dissatisfied with the city as a place to do business. In 
2011, 57% of business owners indicated they were satisfied with the city as a 
place to do business.  The mayor has tasked your office with improving the 
business climate in the city.  The goal has been to increase the percentage of 
business owners satisfied with doing business in the city to 67%.
No Benchmark Benchmark
For this question, imagine that you are the manager of a business development office for a major metropolitan area.  Your city just released its yearly 
performance metrics and, based on this information, the mayor wants to know how you think the city performed over the course of the last year.
Experimental Vignettes and Workflow
XX% of business owners were satisfied with the city as a place to do business.    
   Using the information available to you, use the sliding scale (0-100) to rate 
the city's performance in regard to business development based upon this 
performance information:
XX% of business owners were satisfied with the city as a place to do business.  
Remember, the mayor's goal was that 67% of business owners would be 
satisfied with the city as a place to do business.       Using the information 
available to you, use the sliding scale (0-100) to rate the city's performance in 
regard to business development based upon this performance information:
In the following question you will be given performance information.  You will 
then be asked to provide an assessment of the city's performance over the last 
year given this performance information.  Please only consider the information 
before you at that time when providing an assessment.
After you provide the assessment, on the following screen you will be asked to 
provide a justification for the performance assessment you just provided.












Experience (Overall) 1.73 0.1596
Experience (Public Sector) 2.09 0.1017
This table provides the results of a randomization check for Experiment 2. For each 
treatment group, we provide the mean afor each of eight potential control variables. 
We ran ANOVA tests on each of the controls as a check on randomization. Of note, 
each of the controls appears to pass this check at the p  = 0.05 level.
Variables: PSM (Public service motivation), PSM_APM (Attraction to policy 
making), PSM_CPI (Commitment to public interest), PSM_COM (Compassion), 
PSM_SS (Self-sacrifice); Kim (2011) and Perry (1996).
Randomization Checks
